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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

TO THE FRONT OF THE LINE: SPURRING BIOTECH
COLLABORATION THROUGH PATENT FAST-TRACK
EXAMINATION VOUCHERS
I. INTRODUCTION
The current incentive behind patent law with respect to biotechnology
research may be falling short of its constitutional basis.1 The possibility of
data secrecy and upstream over-patenting may be creating an
“anticommons” that strangles downstream research and development. 2
Instead of focusing on statutory changes to the patent law, an incentive
program by the United States Patent and TradeOffice (“USPTO”) that
encourages voluntary data sharing and open use of research tools by
granting fast-track examination and reexamination vouchers might be a
novel solution to combat the possible anticommons and help “promote the
Progress of Science and the useful Arts” in the realm of biotechnology
research.3 The Alzheimer’s Disease Neuroimaging Initiative (“ADNI”) will be
reviewed as a model for the benefits of data sharing and collaboration.
This Comment will elaborate on this proposal by first introducing the
ADNI as a foundation for the benefits, goals and necessities of data sharing
in biotechnology research in Part II.4 Part III of this Comment will give an
overview of patent law and purposes.5 Part IV will discuss the Bayh-Dole Act
and its influence on university research and patent practices.6 Part V will
discuss the “Theory of the Anticommons,” investigating its possible existence
and impact on biotechnology research.7 Part VI reviews past proposed
solutions to reduce the occurrence and impact of an anticommons on
biotechnology research.8 Part VII gives an overview and criticisms of the
FDA priority review voucher system.9 Part VIII reviews the USPTO proposal
of a humanitarian reexamination voucher program and will propose

1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
2. Under an anticommons, multiple owners hold exclusionary rights in a scarce resource
to such a degree that others cannot effectively use the resource. See infra Part V.A.
3. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
4. See infra Part II.
5. See infra Part III.
6. See infra Part IV.
7. See infra Part V.
8. See infra Part VI.
9. See infra Part VII.
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expansion of this proposal to include patent incentives for entering into data
and research collaboration efforts.10 Finally, Part IX concludes that a fasttrack examination voucher awarded to qualifying researchers who
participate in an open data and research tool collaboration could be an
efficient incentive mechanism to overcome a possible biotechnology
anticommons through voluntary participation.11
II. ALZHEIMER’S DISEASE NEUROIMAGING INITIATIVE (ADNI) AND DATA SHARING
In August of 2010 the beneficial results of a new way of conducting
large scale biomedical research came to light.12 Seven years prior, in
2003, scientists and high-level officials from the National Institutes of
Health, the Food and Drug Administration, universities and non-profit
organizations, along with the pharmaceutical and medical imaging
industries joined forces in an unprecedented, “collaborative effort to find the
biological markers that show the progression of Alzheimer’s disease in the
human brain.”13 Thus the ADNI was born.14
What made the collaboration so unique and ambitious was not only its
goal of tackling Alzheimer’s but also the agreement to “share all the data,
making every single finding public immediately, available to anyone with a
computer anywhere in the world.”15 Since no other research is conducted
under a similar premise, the fact that no single entity could own the data or
file patent applications was “worrisome” to some scientists.16 Many feared
that with open, public ownership of the data, less experienced researchers
could “misinterpret it and publish information that was wrong.”17 However,
as stated by Dr. John Q. Trojanowski, one collaborative researcher from the
University of Pennsylvania, “we all realized that we would never get
biomarkers unless all of us parked our egos and intellectual-property noses
outside the door and agreed that all of our data would be public
immediately.”18 While the data would be shared, the profit incentive
remained through the ability of private entities to file patent applications on
any resulting drugs or diagnostic tests.19

10. See infra Part VIII.
11. See infra Part IX.
12. Gina Kolata, Rare Sharing of Data Led to Results on Alzheimer’s, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
13, 2010, at A1.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Kolata, supra note 12.
18. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
19. Id.
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The collaboration offered a win-win situation to all involved parties.
Prior to the initiative, researchers and pharmaceuticals were trapped in a
“prisoner’s dilemma”;20 everyone “wanted to move the field forward, but no
one wanted to take the risks of doing it.”21 With large data sets requiring
800 subjects, the task was too large for any single entity to tackle.22
Furthermore, developing robust and valid tests for the disease offered “such
limited returns on the investment that it was in no one company’s interest to
pursue it.”23
The ADNI has already been the model for a similar research initiative
sponsored by the Michael J. Fox Foundation in the search for Parkinson’s
biomarkers.24 However, some argue that freely published scientific data,
resources, and “technological prospect[s]” will lead to “‘chaotic, duplicative,
and wasteful’ effort.”25 A counter viewpoint suggests that an absence of
openness will lead researchers to “unknowingly build on something less than
the total accumulation of scientific knowledge or work on problems already
solved.”26 While there are differing opinions on both sides regarding data
sharing and openness, this Comment recognizes the widespread benefits of
such a voluntary research model. This Comment proposes the ADNI model
as a method of attack for many large scale human diseases. By pooling
resources and disclaiming intellectual property rights in the collaborative
results, the investment risks can be reduced. The downstream costs of using
open, freely available data and research methods are essentially eliminated.
This Comment expands upon a recent USPO proposal discussed in Part VIII
to include fast-track patent examination vouchers for collaborating partners
as an incentive to share data and advance scientific research. It is
advanced that such a pull mechanism, operating on the voluntary
participation of collaborating researchers is a more balanced approach to
possible stagnation or anticommons in the biotechnology field than some of
the more radical proposed solutions.27

20. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
21. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
22. Kolata, supra note 12.
23. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
24. Id.
25. Peter Lee, Patents, Paradigm Shifts, and Progress in Biomedical Science, 114 YALE L.J.
659, 670 (2004).
26. Eric G. Campbell et al., Data Withholding in Academic Genetics: Evidence from a
National Survey, 287 JAMA 473, 473 (2002).
27. See infra Part VI.
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III. OVERVIEW OF UNITED STATES PATENT LAW AND IMPACTS ON BIOTECHNOLOGY
RESEARCH
Patent protection in the United States finds its roots in the U.S.
Constitution.28 Article 1, Section 8, Clause 8 states that Congress shall
have the power “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to
their respective Writings and Discoveries.”29 In the absence of patent law,
“copyists may easily free-ride on the efforts of inventors” leading to a market
failure with a dearth of invention.30 Therefore patent law incentivizes
inventive activity and disclosure by giving patent holders, or patentees, the
right to exclude others from practicing, making, selling or offering to sell,
and importing the patented invention.31 This limited monopoly currently
extends for twenty years from the filing date,32 making the time between
filing and patent issue critical to the length of protection and the amount of
investment return.33 Theoretically, the patent law would be the “most
efficient mechanism to incentivize invention . . . while at the same time
ensuring the existence of a public domain upon which additional inventions
may be built.”34 In practice, however, the current patent system “may create
roadblocks to the development of commercial applications, particularly
when applied to a new technology, such as biotechnology.”35
To receive patent protection an invention must be novel,36 have some
utility37 and must be non-obvious.38 Further, the law grants protection to a
“process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and
useful improvement thereof.”39 Absent from the realm of patentable subject
matter are “laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas.”40 The
law views such principles as “part of the storehouse of knowledge of all
28. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
29. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
30. Michael S. Mireles, An Examination of Patents, Licensing, Research Tools, and the
Tragedy of the Anticommons in Biotechnology Innovation, 38 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 141, 144
(2004).
31. Id.
32. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2006).
33. Caroline A. Crenshaw, Patents and Patients: Who Is the Tragedy of the Anticommons
Impacting and Who Is Bearing the Cost of High-Priced Biotechnological Research?, 9 MINN. J.
L. SCI. & TECH. 913, 916 (2008) (citing Brian T. Yeh, Cong. Research Serv., RL33159,
Influenza Antiviral Drugs and Patent Law Issue 6 (2005)).
34. Mireles, supra note 30, at 144.
35. Id.
36. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2006).
37. Id. § 101.
38. Id. § 103.
39. Id. § 101.
40. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3225 (2010) (internal quotations omitted).
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men . . . free to all men and reserved exclusively to none.”41 However, such
inputs, including raw data, to patentable subject matter are closely
guarded42 and it is the intent of this Comment to encourage the sharing of
such inputs.
In the 1980s, the courts took a major step in advancing the
biotechnology research and development field by pushing for “privatization
of medical research and patent protection of new discoveries and treatment
methods.”43 With the 1980 Supreme Court decision in Diamond v.
Chakrabarty, living matter was held to be patentable subject matter within
the ambit of §101.44 The Court granted protection to the respondent’s
micro-organism because it was a “nonnaturally occurring manufacture of
composition of matter – a product of human ingenuity ‘having a distinctive
name, character [and] use.’”45 Reading the patent statutes broadly,46 the
Court recognized that “Congress intended statutory subject matter to include
anything under the sun that is made by man.”47 This decision, along with
the passage of the Bayh-Dole Act (discussed in Part III) laid the foundation
for the biotechnology industry.48
In the thirty years since Chakrabarty was decided, the biotechnology
research and development industry has taken off. However, an early 2010
United States District Court of New York decision49 appeared to put on the
brakes in the realm of gene patenting. In Association for Molecular
Pathology v. United States Patent & Trademark Office (also known as the
Myriad case), the Court held that the breast cancer gene sequences, BRCA1
and BRCA2, are unpatentable subject matter since the
[The] DNA’s existence in an “isolated” form alters neither [the physical
embodiment of biological information] of DNA as it exists in the body nor
the information it encodes. Therefore, the patents at issue directed to
“isolated DNA” containing sequences found in nature are unsustainable as
a matter of law and are deemed unpatentable subject matter under 35
U.S.C. § 101.50

On July 29, 2011 the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit overruled in part the District Court Myriad ruling, holding that such
41. Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948).
42. See infra Part V.B.
43. Crenshaw, supra note 33, at 917.
44. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309-10 (1979).
45. Id.
46. Id. at 308.
47. Id. at 309 (internal quotations omitted).
48. Mireles, supra note 30, at 143.
49. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 702 F. Supp. 2d
181 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 653 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
50. Id. at 185.
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isolated gene sequences are in fact patentable subject matter under §
101.51 Since the isolated DNA sequences at issue “have a distinctive
chemical identity and nature” that is “markedly different” from naturally
occurring molecules, they should be afforded patent protection.52 Falling in
line with Chakrabarty’s “anything under the sun that is made by man”
language, the Federal Circuit found that the method of “cleaving or
synthesizing a portion of native chromosomal DNA imparts” a new and
distinct identity wholly different from the native DNA.53
Interestingly, the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) reversed its long held
position on the patentability of isolated gene sequences in its amicus brief
filing for the Myriad case on October 29, 2010 with the Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit.54 In that brief, the Government stated that “isolated
but otherwise unaltered” genes should not be patentable because they are
elements of nature, thus falling outside the scope of 35 U.S.C. § 101.55
This position runs counter to the decade’s old policy within the USPTO of
granting patents, in addition to the synthetic DNA sequences seen in
Chakrabarty, to isolated, naturally occurring gene sequences.56 Such gene
sequences are “genomic material excised from an organism’s genome and
isolated from the cellular environment in which it normally occurs, but
without material change to its naturally occurring chemical structure and
function.”57 The filing notes that the USPTO sees even isolated genes as
non-naturally occurring since they are not found to exist in such an isolated
manner in nature.58 Proponents of attaching patent rights to isolated gene
sequences, falling in line with current USPTO policy, disagree with the new
policy statement.59 Opponents of patentability, arguing in line with the
DOJ, state that “locking up basic genetic information in patents actually
impedes medical progress.”60 The government states that this change will

51. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 653 F.3d 1329,
1350 (Fed. Cir. 2011), vacated sub nom. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics,
No. 11-725, 2012 WL 986819, at *1 (U.S. Mar. 26, 2012).
52. Id. at 1351.
53. Id. at 1352.
54. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party at 18, Ass’n
for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 653 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2011)
(No. 09-CV-4515) [hereinafter Brief for the United States].
55. Id.
56. Id. at 4.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 5-6.
59. Andrew Pollack, In a Policy Reversal, U.S. Says Genes Should Not Be Eligible for
Patenting, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 2010, at B1.
60. Id.
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have little impact on the genetic sciences, since human manipulations of
genetic sequences will still be afforded patent protection.61
If the Federal Circuit had followed the reasoning of the United States
and upheld the District Court’s ruling the biotechnology research and
development industry could have been seriously damaged. With the
biotechnology field encompassing a large area of the national economy, a
sweeping invalidation of many patents that form its foundation would have
been highly detrimental to the economy as a whole. However if the District
Court ruling had been upheld, it could be argued that putting isolated
genes within the public domain could overcome an anticommons problem
in the biotechnology industry.62 The question of patenting genetic materials
remains unanswered because on March 26, 2012, the Supreme Court
vacated the Federal Circuit holding in Myriad in light of its 9-0 decision in
Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc.63
IV. PASSAGE OF BAYH-DOLE ACT
Between the late 1970s and early 1980s, the federal government
realized that commercialization of government-funded innovations would
require massive investment; however “private firms were unwilling to invest
in commercializing innovations unless those firms received a proprietary
interest in the end product.”64 Therefore to increase commercialization, “the
government determined that technology developed with government funds
should be transferred to the private sector for further research, development,
and investment . . . .”65 In 1980, Congress passed the Bayh-Dole Act as an
amendment to the Patent and Trademark Amendments Act of 1980, which
allowed universities and small companies to retain intellectual property
rights in the inventions developed through the infusion of government
funds.66 Prior to the passage of the Bayh-Dole Act, the biotechnology sector
operated under a commons model, with the federal government funding
“upstream” research that “encouraged broad dissemination of results in the
public domain.”67 These unpatented discoveries could be incorporated by

61. Id.; Brief for the United States, supra note 54, at 11.
62. See infra Part V.A.
63. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, No. 11-725, 2012 WL 986819,
at *1 (U.S. Mar. 26, 2012).
64. Mireles, supra note 30, at 158.
65. Id. at 158-59.
66. Crenshaw, supra note 33, at 917; see generally Bayh-Dole Act, 35 U.S.C. §§ 200211 (2006).
67. Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The
Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698, 698 (1998).
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any developer into “downstream” diagnostic and treatment methods at a
low transaction cost.68
As a result of the passage of Bayh-Dole, collaboration between the
public and private sectors in biotechnology research and development has
flourished.69 Since the federal government is the largest funding entity for
university research and development in the United States, the passage of the
Bayh-Dole Act has had “a tremendous effect on the appropriation of
technology.”70 Government funds currently account for roughly twenty-six
percent of all research and development funding in the United States.71
Further, the government funds nearly sixty percent of all university research
and development.72 Prior to Bayh-Dole, the rate of commercialization of
government-funded technologies was only four percent.73 Biotechnology
patent applications by qualifying entities “increased by more than 300
percent in the first five years after the enactment of the legislation, as
compared with the five years prior to the passage of the Act.”74
By looking at the above numbers, it appears that the Bayh-Dole Act has
achieved the government’s goals of: avoiding stagnating commercial
development of government-funded projects by increasing the efficiency of
transfer “of discoveries that would otherwise languish in government and
university archives”; reviving U.S. industry through new technology infusions
“that would enhance productivity and create new jobs”; and keeping
federally-funded research advances in the U.S. for development by U.S.
firms.75 However, many critics believe that the emphasis on private
commercialization of research runs counter to the ultimate knowledge
seeking purposes of university research.76 Others fear that university
researchers will be “unduly influence[d]” in their decisions on research
projects and paths.77 Scientists may have become more competitive and
less willing to share data that would otherwise spur academic progress out
of fear of losing intellectual property (IP) rights.78 In essence, the private
sector may discourage disclosure and publication of research until

68. Id.
69. Mireles, supra note 30, at 155.
70. Id. at 155-56.
71. Id. at 156.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Mireles, supra note 30, at 160-61.
75. Id. at 159.
76. Id. at 157.
77. Id.
78. Michael Tomasson, Legal, Ethical, and Conceptual Bottlenecks to the Development of
Useful Genomic Tests, 18 ANNALS HEALTH L. 231, 244 (2009).
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intellectual property rights are secured.79 What may result is a lack of
foundational research that other researchers can use as a starting point.80
Under the auspices of increasing collaboration between private industry and
non-profit organizations, the Bayh-Dole Act has “encouraged an alternative
university culture which focuses attention on entrepreneurial activities.”81
Several critics have stated that the Bayh-Dole Act has pushed university
science too far into a “private competitive model.”82
V. THEORY OF THE ANTICOMMONS IN BIOTECHNOLOGY
A.

Defining the Anticommons

To understand the tragedy of the anticommons, one must first look to
the tragedy of the commons. First theorized by Garrett Hardin in 1968,
under the “tragedy of the commons” commonly held resources are overexploited because no single person has any incentive to conserve the
property that they alone do not own.83 Michael Heller and Rebecca
Eisenberg suggest that while such a theory bolsters the argument for private
property rights, it turns a blind eye to resource underuse when the
government grants the property right of exclusion to too many.84 What then
results is an anticommons; where “multiple owners each have a right to
exclude others from a scarce resource and no one has an effective privilege
of use.”85
Following the passage of the Bayh-Dole Act, the privatization of
biomedical discoveries, Heller and Eisenberg argue, has led to a
“proliferation of intellectual property rights upstream [that] may be stifling
life-saving innovations further downstream in the course of research and
product development.”86 Accordingly, aggregating the various privately
held rights in order to advance the science under an anticommons “is often
brutal and slow.”87
The anticommons results in “obstacles to future research” because
privatization has put the rights to prior discoveries in the hands of too

79. Mireles, supra note 30, at 157.
80. Id.
81. Tomasson, supra note 77, at 244.
82. David E. Winickoff et al., Opening Stem Cell Research and Development: A Policy
Proposal for the Management of Data, Intellectual Property, and Ethics, 9 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y
L. & ETHICS 52, 56 (2009).
83. Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 66, at 698.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
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many.88 This has resulted in a “spiral of overlapping patent claims in the
hands of different owners, reaching ever further upstream in the course of
biomedical research.”89 These overlapping claims have increased the cost
of doing business in the biotechnology field because an individual
researcher “needs access to multiple patented inputs to create a single
useful product.”90 With each required upstream patent comes a toll that the
individual patent owner can charge the subsequent researcher “slowing the
pace of downstream biomedical innovation.”91 Beyond slowing the speed
of biomedical development, this “patent thicket” can give rise to an
“innovation malaise born of unwillingness on the part of investors to put
money behind projects because of the uncertainty over whether a cost-viable
path to market will be found for the new, unproven technology.”92
Heller and Eisenberg suggest that the government has fostered the
growth of the anticommons by “creating too many concurrent fragments of
intellectual property rights” in downstream products or by allowing upstream
patentees to “stack licenses on top of the future discoveries of downstream
users.”93
The market of concurrent fragments began in 1991 when the National
Institutes of Health (“NIH”) began filing patent applications on “expressed
sequence tags (ESTs).”94 While the NIH has since ceased this controversial
path, private entities have picked up the baton with patent filings on DNA
sequences and gene fragments prior to “identifying a corresponding gene
protein, biological function, or potential commercial product.”95 If the
USPTO grants such claims, a wealth of raw inputs into the biotechnology
research field will be privatized. Essentially, as more patentees hold rights to
each gene fragment or cell line, later researchers will be required to pay
each patentee for access to the elements needed for further drug and
therapy development. As researchers encounter more “tollbooth[s] on the
road to product development” they may find it difficult and time consuming
to gather the required licenses and are forced to “choose between diverting
resources to less promising projects with fewer licensing obstacles or
proceeding to animal and then clinical testing on the basis of incomplete
information.”96 As a way of navigating the morass of pending rights on
fragments, research firms and universities enter licensing agreements at a
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 66, at 698.
Id.
Id. at 699.
Id.
Winickoff et al., supra note 81, at 73.
Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 66, at 699.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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time when “there is substantial uncertainty as to the scope of patent rights
that will ultimately issue.”97 The patent filing party may have the upper hand
by contractually securing broader rights than the rights recognized once the
patent, if ever, is issued, thus “compound[ing] the obstacles to developing
new products.”98
Another possible source of a biotech anticommons are stacking licenses
found in reach through licensing agreements (“RTLAs”).99 The RTLA grants
the upstream patentee rights to downstream developments, usually in the
form of royalties on sales, “exclusive or non-exclusive license[s] on future
discoveries, or an option to acquire such a license.”100 While RTLAs may be
beneficial to researchers, who can gain immediate access to the patented
research tools with little upfront cost, they give patentees the upper hand
through a “continuing right to be present at the bargaining table as a
research project moves downstream toward product development.”101
Licensing patents provide financial incentives to patentees; while they
may not “eliminate downstream appropriation,” they can “retard it through
the friction of transaction costs.”102 An inefficient market might result due to
administrative red tape, looming deadlines, and scientists’ relative
unfamiliarity of patent licensing practices.103 Not only can transaction costs
significantly increase under an anticommons, there is also a greater
potential for holdout situations when licenses from multiple patentees have
to be independently negotiated in order for scientists to move forward down
a particular research path.104 Under such holdout situations, cognitive
biases can take hold, leading upstream patentees to overinflate the value of
their individual patent.105

97. Id.
98. Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 66, at 699.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Lee, supra note 25, at 674-75.
103. Id. at 675.
104. Id.
105. Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 66, at 701. Heller and Eisenberg explain the issue as
such: “Imagine that one of a set of 50 upstream inventions will likely be the key to identifying
an important new drug, the rest of the set will have no practical use, and a downstream
product developer is willing to pay $10 million for the set. Given the assumption that no
owner knows ex ante which invention will be the key, a rational owner should be willing to sell
her patent for the probabilistic value of $200,000. However, if each owner overestimates the
likelihood that her patent will be the key, then each will demand more than the probabilistic
value, the upstream owners collectively will demand more than the aggregate market value of
their inputs, the downstream user will decline the offers, and the new drug will not be
developed.” Id.
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Evidence of Anticommons at Work in Biotechnology Research and
Development

Paralleling the theory of the anticommons with regard to biotechnology
patents is a 2002 study that found that data withholding is prevalent in
academic genetics.106 Study respondents participating in genetics research
indicated that they had requested information, data or materials pertaining
to published research on average of 8.8 times over the previous three years,
with ten percent of all the requests being denied.107 Forty-seven percent of
research academics reported that at least one of their requests was denied
by a fellow academic.108 The top reasons respondents gave for denying
information, data or material requests were the effort required to produce
the requested information and the necessity of protecting the researcher’s
ability to publish.109 Furthermore, researchers stated that engaging in
commercial endeavors was a key reason for denying a request.110 Nearly
thirty percent of all geneticists stated that their inability to replicate published
results was a “direct result of another academic scientist’s unwillingness to
share information, data, or materials.”111 Data sharing is important within
the scientific community considering that the same number of respondents
ended collaborative research because of data withholding.112 A large
majority feel that such practices are detracting “somewhat or greatly” from
the level of scientific communication and “slowing the rate of progress in
their field of science.”113 The study authors comment on the level of
withholdings, stating
Data withholding may paradoxically occur most commonly during extremely
rapid progress, since scientists are generating large numbers of new findings
that stimulate much jockeying for scientific priority. The commercial
applications of genetics research, along with increasing dependence on
industry funding and the rise of commercial norms in the academy, may be
partially responsible as well for data withholding.114

The study recognizes a drag on genetic research progress that closed data
creates, yet there are pushes within the field toward making data sharing
more prevalent.115

106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

Campbell et al., supra note 26, at 477.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 478.
Id.
Campbell, supra note 26, at 478.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 479.
Id.
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To accomplish data openness and continued progress in the
biotechnology fields, the National Human Genome Research Institute
encourages “rapid release and dissemination of new sequence data by its
funded investigators.”116 Several journals have also stepped up by making
publication contingent on the placement of data and materials in public
depositories or some other broad dissemination mechanism.117 While these
are promising starts to overcome the anticommons theory and the hurdles
presented by closed data, the proposed examination voucher program
could provide the needed incentive to bring forth widespread sharing of
research data and methods.
C. Questioning the Existence of an Anticommons
By incentivizing researchers to share data and patented research tools in
recognized collaborations, the obstacles of license aggregation, reach
through costs and speculative valuations can be reduced or eliminated,
thereby fostering research and development of treatments for complex
diseases. However, some commentators question the existence of an
anticommons in the biotechnology field, or the detriment to innovation
should one exist.118 Searching for the tragedy of the anticommons is a
difficult prospect because “the researcher is attempting to prove a
counterfactual: if something had not happened, then something else would
have resulted.”119 Those warning of the impacts of the anticommons call for
drastic solutions to a possible nonexistent problem, such as: strengthening
the utility requirement, increasing the use of patent pools, granting a more
generous experimental use defense to patent infringement, and most
radically recognizing a fair use exception to patent infringement.120 With no
clear conclusion on whether an anticommons exists, such sweeping changes
to the patent law could “undermine the incentives provided by patents to
invent, disclose, and innovate.”121 Since the patent system caters to many
different technical fields, changing the rules to correct for possible
deficiencies in one sector could have unintended consequences in myriad
others. The biotechnology industry, as with all industries where capital
investment is critical, “requires stable and strong property rights to justify
investment in research and development.”122

116. Campbell, supra note 26, at 479.
117. Id.
118. David E. Adelman & Kathryn L. DeAngelis, Patent Metrics: The Mismeasure of
Innovation in the Biotech Patent Debate, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1677, 1680 (2007).
119. Mireles, supra note 30, at 145.
120. Id. at 146.
121. Id.
122. Id.
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After a thorough empirical study of the biotechnology landscape in the
United States, David Adelman found that there is “little evidence that recent
growth in biotechnology patenting is threatening innovation.”123 The study
comprised 52,000 United States granted biotechnology patents from
January 1990 through December 2004.124 While Heller and Eisenberg
suggest that concurrent fragment ownership is a cause of an
anticommons,125 this study found that biotechnology patent ownership is
diffuse, with the largest companies obtaining fewer than thirty biotechnology
patents per year on average.126 Further, there has been a steady increase in
the number of entities obtaining patents in the biotechnology field.127 Such
a “continuous record of new market entrants” and the absence of
concentrated control lend weight to the argument that “biotechnology
patenting is not adversely affecting innovation.”128 The Adelman study
posits that the current debate has “morphed the anticommons theory into
one that associates rising patent numbers almost inexorably with patent
anticommons, transforming Heller and Eisenberg’s contextually delimited
theory into a generalized model premised on a relatively simple relationship
existing between patent counts and transaction costs.”129 The study
questions the “assumption that upstream patents will inevitably restrict
access to essential research tools for which no alternatives exist,” and finds
the “generalized anticommons theory” to be “empirically elusive.”130
The Adelman study looks to the rise and fall of patent applications as
one factor to determine the presence of an anticommons.131 The study
found that in 1998 biotechnology patent issuances per year peaked at
5,977 and by 2004 that rate had decreased by twenty-nine percent to
4,324 per year.132 The study suggests that such a decrease could be seen
as the generalized anticommons theory at work; “a drop in innovative
output [after 1999] brought about by the fragmenting effects of thousands
of patents . . . on research and development” could be seen as the point
where “spiraling licensing costs” tipped the scales against the incentives to
patent.133 However, the study looks deeper, noting that the number of
patent applications filed (versus patents issued) for “biotechnology patents
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

Adelman & DeAngelis, supra note 117, at 1680.
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Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 66, at 698.
Adelman & DeAngelis, supra note 117, at 1681.
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Id. at 1686.
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rose substantially post 1999.”134 This observation pierces a hole in the
anticommons theory.135
While the study looks to economic factors,136 it finds more influence in
the USPTO changes.137 First, the study acknowledges a move within the
patent office to a stronger utility requirement as an explanation of the
“dramatic leveling off of biotechnology patenting.”138 Such a change could
account for the lengthened prosecution time and the increase of denials
after 1999.139 Suggesting not an anticommons at work, but a more fine
toothed comb, “the number of biotechnology patent applications filed with
the PTO increased by about forty percent while the number of . . . patents
issued declined by almost thirty percent.”140
The study further weakens the anticommons theory by evaluating two
strong transient influences on the declining patent rates. The first identified
factor is the June 1995 change in patent term from seventeen years from
issue to twenty years from filing that caused a spike in biotechnology patent
applications, with 4,602 filings in 1994, 7,626 in 1995, and 4,045 in
1996.141 The second, and more revealing, transient factor regarding the
“falloff in the number of biotechnology patents issued likely reflects a
saturation of examiner resources.”142 With only a finite number of patent
examiners dedicated to the growing biotechnology field, “the rate-limiting
step in issuing patents is no longer inventive output but the PTO itself.”143
The study determined that the USPTO’s “maximum review capacity lags
current application rates by hundreds of patents” across all biotechnology
categories.144 This finding is crucial to the proposal of this Comment
regarding fast-track examination vouchers. With a lack of examiner
resources, a voucher that would allow an inventor to get to the front of the
examination line could be highly prized in an open market. Such a lucrative
commodity, transferrable to any willing purchaser in any industry, could be
pivotal in incentivizing data and research tool sharing in the biotechnology
field.
Further strengthening the Adelman argument against the existence of an
anticommons is the aforementioned diffuse ownership of biotechnology
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
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patents, as evidenced by the “low averages for the number of patents
received annually per assignee.”145 Over the fifteen year study, the average
number of total biotechnology patents issued per assignee was roughly
twelve, less than one patent per year, and approximately “fifty percent of
assignees obtained no more than twenty-five patents . . . .”146 With this
modest data in hand, it is plausible to “suggest that no single entity has the
patent capital necessary to dominate biotechnology research and
development.”147 While diffuse ownership would tend to require increased
numbers of licenses to conduct research and development, Adelman
suggests an anticommons does not play a role, as empirical studies show
that no more than a “handful” of patents need to be licensed.148
Adelman surmises that scientists cannot keep pace with the “explosion of
new information” in the biotechnology field, suggesting that the
opportunities “far exceed the capacities of the scientific community.”149
Research scientists note that the need to license patents can be eliminated
by following a parallel research path. This parallel research path is what
Peter Lee finds to be particularly beneficial to biotechnology progress even
under an anticommons.150
D. Benefits of an Anticommons in Biotechnology Research and
Development
Lee shifts his focus from applied science to patents’ effect on the
“advancement of scientific theory, the scientific community’s conceptual
understanding of the basic structure and properties of natural
phenomena.”151 Lee finds benefits in the ability of patents to induce
“paradigm shifts”; the “creation of a novel theoretical framework that better
explains a particular set of natural phenomena . . . .”152 Shifting research
frameworks may be a key to success in certain areas of disease research
and treatment development, lending support to the argument that an
anticommons is actually beneficial. A strong field of patents can open the
door to new avenues, “encouraging scientists to experiment outside the
realm of mainstream research tools, encourag[ing] them to generate and
An anticommons landscape may incentivize
test new theories.”153
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researchers to “reconceptualize familiar natural processes” from a different
reference frame that avoids prior art.154 The typical patent incentive shifts
from receiving payments to an “incentive to innovate in order to avoid
paying someone else and accepting exogenous constraints on one’s
research.”155 It is suggested that this may be key to Alzheimer’s research.156
“For a neuroscientist working on a treatment for Alzheimer’s disease, the
exclusive patents on human embryonic stem cells provide an incentive not
only to investigate alternate mechanisms for neurogenesis but also to test
alternate theories of brain structure, physiology, and the pathology of
Alzheimer’s itself.”157
Patents can be seen as a “fulcrum defining the balance between two
kinds of valuable scientific activity: hypothesis validation and exploration
(comprising the main business of normal science) and hypothesis generation
(leading to paradigm shifts).”158 Without evaluating this balance, discussion
about changes to patent doctrine are “uniformed and incomplete.”159
VI. PAST PROPOSED SOLUTIONS TO THE POSSIBLE ANTICOMMONS IN
BIOTECHNOLOGY
In order to overcome issues of a possible anticommons in biotechnology
research, commentators have proposed various solutions. However, many
of the proposals could be too far-reaching, resulting in many unintended
outcomes in industries outside of the biotechnology realm. Protection under
the patent law should be uniform for all technology sectors, yet several of
the proposals could implement different rules for different technologies.
A.

Mandatory Data Release for Publicly-Funded Research

Prior to publication of the Heller and Eisenberg article outlining the
anticommons theory, the U.S. House of Representatives, meeting in July
1997, proposed an appropriations bill amendment that would require
researchers operating with government grants to make available to the
public all of their raw medical and scientific data within ninety days of the
first publication of any study results.160 Exempt from such disclosure
requirements would be defense research and research where required
disclosure would result in “economic harm to commercial proprietary

154. Id. at 686 (internal citations omitted).
155. Lee, supra note 25, at 687.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 665.
159. Id.
160. George D. Thurston, Mandating the Release of Health Research Data: Issues and
Implications, 11 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 331, 331 (1997).
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interests.”161 The initial proposal was in response to industry calls for data
on air pollution studies;162 however the broad mandate would have had a
major impact on biotechnology research, publication and patent strategies.
The proposal was defeated but raised questions about the forced
publication of government-funded research.163
The foundation of the proposal, running against Bayh-Dole, was that the
research was paid for by taxpayer-funded government grants and should
therefore be placed in the public domain for any and all to critique and
evaluate.164 While there could be benefits of increased validity through
broader scrutiny, ethical and practical concerns were also raised.165 Forced
data release could have an adverse effect on “(1) the scientific credibility of
the research involved, (2) the confidentiality of research participants’
medical records, (3) the intellectual ownership of research ideas and their
results, and (4) the speed of research progress in the medical and public
health fields.”166
While a mandatory data release program could “represent a major loss,
professionally and financially” to researchers and organizations,167 this
Comment’s proposed voluntary program of data sharing coupled with
USPTO vouchers could overcome such financial loss. Furthermore, the
government views that its grants are simply that; they are not contracts that
purchase the product of the grantee’s work, but are instead mechanisms to
“support or stimulate activity which serves the public good.”168 This view
aligns with Bayh-Dole and runs counter to the mandated data release
proposal. The proposed data release mandate could result in an overall
slowing of biotechnological and medical research.169 Study participants
could be less likely to apply for fear that their personal health information
would be publicly available.170 The ninety day data release imposition
would incentivize researchers to not publish study results until all research
avenues are pursued, leading to a dearth of scientific publication in a
particular field for years.171 The mandated data release proposal would
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effectively stall scientific advancement by closing researchers off from the
public and their colleagues in the scientific community.172
However, a voluntary program incentivized by the USPTO, as proposed,
could overcome some of these issues. Working under a voluntary data
release model, participants from the outset could be informed on how their
personally-identifiable information, if any would be released. Up-front
voluntary agreements to openly share data could have the opposite effect as
the mandated data release schedule. Following ADNI, data would be
released as soon as possible, giving all researchers access to larger data
pools, spurring activity down alternate research paths.
B.

Mandatory Experimental Use Phase After Patent Issuance

Leveraging the experimental use defense to patent infringement, some
commentators see an expansion of that defense as a tool to overcome a
possible anticommons in biotechnological research.173 Justice Story first
hinted at an experimental use defense in his 1813 opinion in Whittemore v.
Cutter.174 He stated that “it could never have been the intention of the
legislature to punish a man, who constructed such a machine merely for
philosophical experiments, or for the purpose of ascertaining the sufficiency
of the machine to produce its described effects.”175 Successive courts have
recognized the experimental use defense in the theoretical realm; however
they have rarely been swayed to follow it in practice.176
Lee calls for strengthening the experimental use defense into an
operating, “robust” exception.177 The proposed exception would apply to
any material or process that is defined by the National Institutes of Health
(NIH) as a research tool.178 Such conforming technology would be granted
a “research tool patent” where immediately after patent issue and for a finite
period of time a “robust experimental use exception” would be in force.179
During this finite period, any “noncommercial experimental use of the
patented research tool would be permitted.”180 This broad definition of

172. Id. at 349.
173. Lee, supra note 25, at 691.
174. See Whittemore v. Cutter, 29 F. Cas. 1120, 1120 (D. Mass. 1813) (No. 17,600).
Justice Story decided this case while sitting as a United States Supreme Court Justice.
MEMBERS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF US, SUPREME COURT OF THE U.S., http://www.supreme
court.gov/about/members_text.aspx (last visited on Feb. 12, 2011).
175. Whittemore, 29 F. Cas. at 1121.
176. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights and
Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1017, 1023 (1989).
177. Lee, supra note 25, at 691.
178. Id.
179. Id.
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experimental use would give safe haven to any use of a research tool that
was not “intended to produce, or that did not actually produce, a
commercial application.”181 Lee suggests that this finite time last for five
years to allow for a balancing of time scientists need to perform and publish
experiments using the patented tools, and the ability of the patentees to
recoup their costs.182 After five years, the exception would expire and “any
nonlicensed use of the patented material, even for experimentation with no
direct commercial application, would constitute infringement.”183
Such a proposal would foster similar goals as a voluntary data sharing
collaboration by allowing “[f]ree access to research tools closely associated
with an insurgent theory of natural causation . . . enabl[ing] members of the
scientific community to engage in the crucial process of testing, refuting,
and perhaps validating that theory.”184 However, this system would create a
separate patent system for a separate technological group and as Lee
admits, would “invert current legal frameworks of intellectual property.”185
Lee’s proposal would grant open access to the patented research tool right
from the beginning, close access once the exception expires and, following
normal patent law, allow for unrestricted open use after the patent has
expired.186
While it is suggested that such a model would still incentivize
innovation,187 it is expected that it would do just the opposite. With patent
term length being so important to patentees, such a proposal removes
patent protection from at least the first quarter of the patent term.188 With
the fast changes in biotechnology, by the time the patent protection
“reattaches” to the patent, there may be little or no commercial value left in
the patented technology. While positing a default five year exception, Lee
places the burden on Congress for determining the “optimal length” of the
experimental use exception by exploring the “cost structure of creating new
research tools, rates of research tool invention and obsolescence, and the

181. Id. at 691 n.158.
182. Lee, supra note 25, at 691.
183. Id. at 691-92.
184. Id. at 692.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. See Lee, supra note 25, at 692.
188. This assumes the impossible: that the patent issues immediately. With current patent
term being twenty years from filing and the time from application to issuance (average total
pendency) being 34.6 months in FY 2009, a five-year experimental use exception could
eliminate just over a third of the actual effective patent term. See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK
OFFICE, 2010-2015 STRATEGIC PLAN 10, available at http://www.uspto.gov/about/stratplan/
USPTO_2010-2015_Strategic_Plan.pdf [hereinafter USPTO STRATEGIC PLAN].
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time horizon for conducting biomedical experiments.”189 However, such a
detailed analysis of biotechnological research landscapes seem better suited
for determination by the market and a traditional patent system without an
experimental use exception. By placing the final determination on whether a
particular technology would receive a “research tool patent” in the hands of
the USPTO, with possible input from the NIH,190 it is assumed that such a
“research tool patent” would be mandatory for any qualifying application.
Without mandatory participation, there would be few — if any— patent
applicants who would chose to have an unenforceable patent for the first
five years or more. Overall, such a proposal seems inefficient at spurring
biotechnological research growth by artificially weakening the patent
through Congressional, rather than market, valuation of the research tool.
C. Patent Prizes
In an effort to overcome a detriment to distribution that the patent
monopoly can present, some have called for the awarding of patent
prizes.191 Patent prizes are most effective in the pharmaceutical realm where
“a single successful patent is closest to being a successful product.”192
Through direct investment in a patented technology, the patent prize
operates as a pull mechanism on research193 by ensuring a market for a
patented technology.194 The prize could further innovation by placing the
intellectual property in the public domain or could operate as a subsidy of a
particular patented technology or treatment.195 However, such a system
carries issues of determining which patent deserves the prize, calculating the
amount to be paid and determining the best “delivery method to stimulate
innovation.”196 One author has suggested that the patent prize can be
effective at bringing malaria treatments to market through aid organizations
providing payment-per dose.197 The estimated payment commitment would
be $3.1 billion and bestows the prize on the vaccine developer and
increases the incentive to produce through the payment for every dose

189. Lee, supra note 25, at 691 n.157.
190. Id. at 691 n.156.
191. Kyle See Kyle Wamstad, Priority Review Vouchers – A Piece of the Incentive Puzzle, 14
VA. J.L. & TECH. 126, 139 (2009).
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delivered.198 Such an amount would be sufficient to provide research and
development incentive while maintaining public health cost effectiveness.199
D. Open Source Approaches to Biotechnology Research and Development
Moving closer to the foundation of the proposed voluntary data sharing
and patent voucher proposal of this Comment, is the call for applying open
source ideals from the software industry to the biotechnology field.
Returning to the most fundamental view of science, some view patent
enforcement of scientific discoveries as being diametrically opposed to the
“traditional scientific norms [that] call . . . for free dedication of new
knowledge to the scientific community.”200 Moving away from a discourse
on whether an anticommons exists and instead focusing on “identify[ing]
and promot[ing] the wealth of intrinsic benefits associated” with an open
source biotechnology model may be more productive.201
A main issue of the current closed research system is the absence of
motivation to replicate prior scientific experiments.202 There is little to be
gained by scientists who wish to scrutinize work through replication; funding,
recognition and publication are unlikely to result from such activities,203
however beneficial they may be in confirming or altering biotechnological
discoveries. Especially during the paradigmatic shifts that may be required
to solve the most complex diseases, open access to research data and
discoveries can be key in order to challenge prior theories or offer
alternative explanations.204 An open source model therefore facilitates
scrutiny205 and helps to eliminate errors.206 With more eyes focused on the
openly available research data and methods, higher quality research may
result.207
With greater scrutiny, open access “promotes scientific progress by
permitting other scientists to use prior discoveries in subsequent
research.”208 By allowing the free flow of data between collaborative
researchers, an open source model will also likely bring about a “more

198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Eisenberg, supra note 175, at 1046.
201. Yann Joly, Open Source Approaches in Biotechnology: Utopia Revisited, 59 ME. L.
REV. 385, 387 (2007).
202. Eisenberg, supra note 175, at 1050.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 1053.
205. Id.
206. Joly, supra note 200, at 398.
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modular and effective coordination of research projects.”209 Within an
open source research project, every user is a “potential source of new ideas
for future directions in the product, and the workload for implementing
change is shared between an expanded group of developers.”210
Expanding the pool of researchers is especially important for large-scale
research efforts such as the ADNI and its Parkinson’s follower. The value of
the massive amounts of data that these experiments generate is increased
when “shared between various research groups, because sharing enables
researchers to identify networks of genes or proteins that function in
concert.”211 The successful human genome project, conducted through
collaboration between sequencing centers located around the globe is a
testament to how collaboration benefits the progress of science.212
While some see an anticommons or patent thicket increasing transaction
costs through RTLAs, open source research collaborations can reduce such
costs.213 With data openly available, complex licensing agreements are not
necessary, eliminating the costs of paying for the license and the time
intensive negotiations involved in hashing out specifics.214 By dedicating
data and research to the public domain, downstream negotiations and
associated costs of internal and external IP access and patent protection are
averted.215 Through placing data into community databases, scientists are
given the tools to “quickly explore the links among genes, proteins, mRNAs,
phenotypic data, RNAi data, microarray data,” and other biomarkers that
are research critical.216 Such open, collaborative databases can spur
innovation by reducing the time and associated costs that researchers spend
on gathering information.217 Therefore, placing such patentable research in
the public domain can avert an anticommons altogether.218
The aforementioned open source collaborations built upon voluntary
participation would likely perform much better than the previously noted
robust experimental use exception or other compulsory licensing
agreements. Such compulsive measures require the government to carry
out the difficult job of determining the proper compensation and can

209. Joly, supra note 200, at 399.
210. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
211. Katherine M. Nolan-Stevaux, Open Source Biology: A Means to Address the Access &
Research Gaps?, 23 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH L.J. 271, 282 (2007).
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contravene the “goals of the patent system to reward innovation.”219
Therefore, the expansion of the USPTO proposed reexamination voucher
program would provide an incentive to enter into voluntary open source
research collaborations: leaving the value determinations to the research
scientists interested in participating.
VII. FDA PRIORITY REVIEW VOUCHER SYSTEM AND CRITICISMS
While the debate on whether an anticommons exists in the
biotechnology research and development field, a method of incentivizing
research in the area of neglected diseases provides a foundation for the
proposal of this Comment.
To overcome a lack of financial incentive for pharmaceutical companies
to invest money in developing neglected diseases that plague low-income
countries, David Ridley, Henry Grabowski and Jeffrey Moe proposed a novel
solution220 that was quickly adopted by the FDA.221 This solution comprised
of a “priority-review voucher” granted to drug companies that developed
drug therapies for diseases affecting low-income countries.222 To qualify for
the proposed voucher the therapy was required to:
(1) treat neglected diseases such as African trypanosomiasis, Chagas
disease, leishmaniasis, or dengue fever; (2) receive approval by the U.S.
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) or the European Agency for the
Evaluation of Medicinal Products; (3) be clinically superior to existing
treatments, (4) forgo patent rights; and (5) find at least one manufacturer for
the product.223

What provided the incentive was that upon meeting the above requirements,
the granted voucher entitled the grantee to “priority FDA review for another
drug (or possibly multiple drugs) and orphan tax credits.”224 Furthermore,
the voucher would be completely transferrable on the open market.225
Such a voucher could have the dual benefit of bringing successful drug
therapies to neglected diseases while speeding access to “blockbuster” drug
therapies in the developed world.226 Through the nexus of these two
benefits, the drugs which could be most benefited by priority review will be

219. Id. at 310.
220. David B. Ridley et al., Developing Drugs for Developing Countries, 25 HEALTH AFF.
313, 313 (2006).
221. Wamstad, supra note 190, at 140.
222. Ridley et al., supra note 219, at 313.
223. Id. at 313-14.
224. Id. at 314.
225. Id. at 313, 314.
226. Id. at 315.
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highlighted through the voucher market.227 The authors estimate that the
value of an individual voucher could be worth upwards of $300 million for
a blockbuster drug, in that it could decrease FDA review time by two-thirds,
from an average of eighteen months to six months.228 While the priority
review does not lower the safety and efficacy standards necessary to gain
FDA approval, the proposed system would require more FDA resources and
an increased cost of $1 million over a standard review.229 The authors
proposed a user fee on the voucher that would cover such costs.230
Another variant of the proposed FDA program would include a
government-facilitated auction of the priority-review voucher to a drug
manufacturer.231 This second option would eliminate the direct transfers
from drug developer to manufacturer, but would still provide a payment
incentive to the developer of a neglected disease treatment.232
Both proposals include push and pull mechanisms to stimulate
neglected areas of science and can easily be applied to areas of possible
stagnation. Push strategies can subsidize research inputs by decreasing
research and development costs, while pull strategies work to incentivize
research output through increasing financial returns.233
On September 27, 2007, shortly after the above priority review voucher
proposal, President George W. Bush signed into law the Food and Drug
Administration Amendments of 2007 (“FDAAA”).234 The bill added section
524 to section 1102 of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act which authorized
the FDA to award priority review vouchers to developers of therapies for
The bill also gives the
specific enumerated tropical diseases.235
Commissioner of the FDA power to make eligible for the voucher program
“[a]ny other infectious disease for which there is no significant market in
developed nations and that disproportionately affects poor and
marginalized populations.”236 Included in the bill was the market incentive
of transferable priority review vouchers first proposed by Ridley, Grabowski
and Moe.237
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Not included in the bill was a proposed pull mechanism of a
“transferable patent exclusivity right.”238 Such transferable right would have
granted a right to an extended patent term on a different product in return
for licensing a product for a neglected disease.239 Senator Brownback (RKansas) was pleased to see that such a provision for patent extensions for
pharmaceuticals was not included, averting the “political divisiveness” that is
appurtenant with such extensions.240 Previous proposed patent extensions
on pharmaceuticals tended to limit the “rewards for innovation to those
companies that possessed existing valuable patents and played havoc with
generic manufacturers.”241 The proposed and adopted priority review
voucher program overcomes this issue by giving any holder two valuable
paths independent of prior patent ownership: using the voucher for internally
developed treatments, or selling it to the highest bidder.242 “Allowing
transferability of the vouchers and limiting the commitment of the innovators
are the most significant features of the voucher program.”243
A.

Responses and Criticisms

Despite avoiding the political mine field of patent extensions, the priority
review voucher system is not immune to criticisms. Considering the novelty
of the system and the attendant uncertainties of the actual process, many
large pharmaceutical firms are wary of participating until more specifics of
the process are determined.244 Thus, those with the most to gain, the largest
players with the deepest pockets, are waiting on the sidelines questioning
“how the FDA will fit a standard application into a priority review voucher
slot.”245
Furthermore, others criticize the plan for not requiring the
pharmaceutical company to make available the drug therapy as a
contingency for obtaining the voucher.246 The proposed patent voucher
program in this Comment would require dissemination of research data and
discoveries in order to obtain the voucher.
Until the market for the FDA vouchers is established and a confident
value assigned to such vouchers, large pharmaceutical companies may not
reallocate research capital to underserved and otherwise low-profit

238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.

Ridley et al., supra note 219, at 317.
Id.
Wamstad, supra note 190, at 140.
Id. at 141.
Id.
Id. at 143.
Id.
Wamstad, supra note 190, at 143.
Id. at 144.
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diseases.247 The value of the voucher is wholly dependent upon the
speculative value of a potential blockbuster drug.248 Therefore, some point
to a disconnect between the incentive and innovation, which could result in
an “inefficient and potentially dangerous way of encouraging research into
tropical diseases.”249 The majority of pharmaceutical firms that develop
drugs for tropical diseases tend to hold smaller drug portfolios and are
unlikely to use their own vouchers.250 While this can facilitate the sale of the
vouchers to large firms, such transfers could bring only marginal
Furthermore, such transactions may be devoid of
innovation.251
transparency whereby intellectual property transfers may result that increase
costs and restrict access to subsequent therapies.252 Such outcomes may be
detrimental to the entire goal of the FDA voucher program. Some fear that
the priority review voucher program may lead to fast-track approval of drugs
with “little or no clinical urgency” that are subjected to inadequate levels of
FDA review.253
VIII. USPTO HUMANITARIAN REEXAMINATION VOUCHER SYSTEM
With the FDA priority review voucher as a baseline, the USPTO
proposed a similar voucher system on September 20, 2010 as a “probusiness strateg[y] for incentivizing the development and widespread
distribution of technologies that address humanitarian needs.”254 Seeing
that “patents under reexamination are often the most commercially
significant patents,” the USPTO proposed a fast-track ex parte
reexamination voucher.255 Such a voucher would be a valuable incentive to
investigate or make patented technologies available for humanitarian use
since it would enable patent owners to reaffirm the validity of their patents in
a more efficient and cost effect manner.256 Paralleling the FDA program,
the proposed USPTO reexamination voucher could be used for any patent
owned by the voucher grantee or could be sold on the open market.257
Qualifying technologies need not be originally developed for humanitarian

247. Id.
248. Aaron S. Kesselheim, Drug Development for Neglected Diseases – The Trouble with
FDA Review Vouchers, 359 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1981, 1981 (2008).
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Kesselheim, supra note 247, at 1982.
254. Request for Comments on Incentivizing Humanitarian Technologies and Licensing
Through the Intellectual Property System, 75 Fed. Reg. 57,261, 57,261 (Sept. 20, 2010).
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Id.
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needs; patent owners can broadly show “humanitarian uses [or research] of
patented technologies” or “licensing [behavior] that address humanitarian
needs.”258
Reexaminations to which the fast-track voucher apply, would be elevated
to the highest priority, wherein an examiner would process the
reexamination as if it were next in the queue.259 Furthermore, the USPTO
proposes a goal of accelerating reexamination time for fast-track
reexaminations to six months.260 Shortening of the process is where the true
value of the voucher may lay considering that the current timeframe for
reexamination proceedings is nineteen to twenty months.261 A patent holder
who wishes to use a fast-track voucher would not forfeit any “statutory and
procedural rights, and would have the same time periods for filing
responses and other communications as those under the existing
procedure.”262
A.

Proposed Expansions to Incentivize Open Data Collaboration and
Research Tool Sharing

While the USPTO tracks closely to the FDA priority review voucher
program, this Comment calls for an expansion of their proposal on several
fronts. First, looking to the success that ADNI has achieved in publicly
sharing all of its gathered data, the proposal should include a provision for
collaborative research and development efforts focused on challenging
health issues (Alzheimer’s, cancer, Parkinson’s, Multiple Sclerosis, etc.) that
are not restricted to neglected or humanitarian diseases. However, the free
and open exchange of research data and methods must be a key
component of the research collaboration. Further paralleling the ADNI,
those entering the collaboration must give up all intellectual property rights
on processes, methods, products, etc. that were developed during research.
This would include any research data, cell lines, novel processes to develop
cell lines, novel data extraction and analysis techniques, or any other
patentable subject matter that resulted from the search for a particular
biomarker or biological process that was the aim of the collaboration.
However, the collaborators and wholly outside developers could still
maintain an intellectual property right in any drug or therapy that resulted
from the identified biomarkers, cell lines or processes. The voucher would
be an integral part in incentivizing researchers to give up their patent rights.

258. Id. at 57,261-62.
259. Request for Comments on Incentivizing Humanitarian Technologies and Licensing
Through the Intellectual Property System, 75 Fed. Reg. at 57,261.
260. Id. at 57,261-62.
261. Id. at 57,262.
262. Id.
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Second, the priority review voucher program should be expanded to
vouchers for examination proceedings; going beyond the proposed
reexamination proceedings. Therefore, scientists or research organizations
involved in qualified research collaborations (who gave up their initial right
to file a patent on behalf of their work) would be able to apply the voucher
to any drug or therapy that resulted from their research, independent of
whether such was the result of the collaborative effort or other closed
research. Essentially, researchers would lose out on patent protection on
early discoveries by entering the collaboration, but would obtain the right to
jump to the front of the queue in any subsequent patent filing. Since the
United States patent term of twenty years begins at time of filing,263 the
faster a patent application becomes an issued patent, the longer the
effective patent monopoly the patent holder would be entitled. Expanding
the program to include fast-track examinations may require significant
workforce expansions within the patent office. This would be required to
overcome the previously discussed issue of examiner saturation.264 However,
the USPTO is currently engaged in an effort to increase examination
capacity and efficiency.265 One step to achieving this goal is through
workforce expansions of 1000 examiners in FY 2011 and FY 2012.266 With
the signing into law of the America Invents Act (AIA), the USPTO now has
the ability to determine its own fee structures267 which should help the Office
in attaining its goal of workforce expansion.
While allowing applicants to get to the front of the examination queue
could be seen as more radical than a fast-tracked reexamination voucher,
the USPTO already provides applicants options for prioritized
examinations.268 A longstanding procedure, Section 708.02 of the Manual
of Patent Examining Procedures allows for applicants to file a Petition to
263. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2006).
264. See Adelman & DeAngelis., supra note 117, at 1691.
265. USPTO STRATEGIC PLAN, supra note 187, at 8.
266. Id. at 12.
267. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (AIA), Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 10, 125 Stat. 284,
316 (2011) (to be codified at 35 U.S.C. § 41). More significantly, the AIA changes the United
States patent regime from a first-to-invent system to a first-to-file system by overhauling 35
U.S.C. § 102. Id. § 3; see also 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2006). Even with this change to first-to-file,
the proposed fast-track examination vouchers would still be beneficial as the term of effective
patent protection remains at 20 years from filing. See 35 U.S.C. § 154; AIA § 3(j).
268. See USPTO Patent Examination Acceleration Programs and Proposals, U.S. PATENT &
TRADEMARK OFF., http://www.uspto.gov/patents/process/file/accelerated/comp_chart_dom_
accel.pdf (last visited Jan. 15, 2012); see also Accelerated Examination, U.S. PATENT &
TRADEMARK OFF., http://www.uspto.gov/patents/process/file/accelerated/index.jsp (last visited
Jan. 15, 2012); Patent Prosecution Highway (PPH) – Fast Track Examination of Applications,
U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFF., http://www.uspto.gov/patents/init_events/pph/index.jsp (last
visited Jan 15, 2012).
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Make Special asking for priority review of the patent application.269
Currently there is a small entity petition available for biotechnology patents,
however a fee is required.270 Under this proposed expansion of the USPTO
reexamination voucher, an examination voucher would achieve a result
similar to the biotech exception; however the voucher could be used by any
entity, small or large, and would waive the associated fee. Similarly, a
prioritized examination procedure has been implemented in the USPTO.271
The goal of the Prioritized Examination track (Track 1) is to “provide final
disposition within twelve months of prioritized status being granted.”272 For
the fiscal year of 2011, prioritized examination requests are limited to
10,000; however the USPTO intends to reevaluate this number to determine
future appropriate limits.273 Applicants wishing to have their applications
processed through Track 1 must pay a $4000 fee, in addition to normal
USPTO fees, for a total cost of $5,520 ($4,892 for small entities).274 Under
this Comment’s proposed fast-track examination voucher system, a voucher
holder would be able to waive the $4000 Track 1 Prioritized Examination
fee, thus providing another incentive to enter into a data collaboration
initiative. Furthermore, the proposed program could exempt voucherholders from the 10,000 applicant limit or any future limits set by the
USPTO, enhancing the market value for such vouchers.
Similar to the USPTO proposal and the FDA program, the expanded
examination voucher program would allow for sale of the vouchers on the
open market. The program could allow for purchasers of the voucher to be
outside the realm of biotechnology. Theoretically, an IBM, Boeing, or GE
could purchase a fast-track examination voucher and apply it to a nonbiotechnology patent application. Broadening the program to include
examination vouchers could strengthen the market more than simply
restricting it to reexamination vouchers. There may be patent holders with
few-if any-patents in reexamination proceedings that would otherwise benefit

269. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, MANUAL OF PATENT
EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 708.02 (8th ed., 8th rev. 2010).
270. Id.
271. Changes to Implement the Prioritized Examination Track (Track 1) of the Enhanced
Examination Timing Control Procedures, 76 Fed. Reg. 18,399, 18,399-18,400 (Apr. 4,
2011) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 1). Prioritized examination has also received backing
from the newly passed American Invents Act. AIA § 25 (amending 35 U.S.C. § 2(b)(2))
(stating that prioritized examination should be available for “applications for products,
processes, or technologies that are important to the national economy or national
competitiveness.”).
272. Changes to Implement the Prioritized Examination Track (Track 1) of the Enhanced
Examination Timing Control Procedures, 76 Fed. Reg. at 18,400.
273. Id.
274. Id.; 37 C.F.R. § 1.102(e) (2011).
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from the line-cutting during the application phase that the examination
voucher would provide. A problem that could arise through broadening the
market to non-biotechnology related firms and applications is that it may
introduce uncertainty into the voucher market due to variations in voucher
valuations. The value of the voucher would most likely depend on what the
patent applicant believes is the potential worth of their application and the
value in having such application proceed through prosecution at a faster
rate. Patents from different industries would most definitely hold varied
values, unlike the typical blockbuster drug that the FDA voucher is marketed
toward. Such uncertainty may stall the voucher market and the overall level
of collaboration.
The fast-track examination voucher could also become a defensive tool,
especially in the pharmaceutical industry. A pharmaceutical maker with a
blockbuster drug that is nearing the end of its patent term may purchase a
voucher simply to stall a competitor from entering the market. By
purchasing the voucher at a price the competitor cannot pay, the winning
pharmaceutical maker will effectively force the losing competitor to either
seek a fast-track voucher from another holder or proceed through patent
prosecution at the normal rate. Large, profitable pharmaceutical companies
may make an effort to purchase many vouchers, with no intention of using
them, simply to hold competitors at a disadvantage. While this may appear
to be a failure of the voucher system, the goal of the program is still being
met. With voucher prices increased by companies looking for a competitive
advantage, research collaborations become more enticing, resulting in
more raw data and research tools available to the greater scientific
community.
By creating an incentive program based on voluntary participation, the
patent system would not differ in its treatment of patent applications based
on technology area like the mandatory experimental use exception stated
above.275 Essentially, an issued patent that was prosecuted with a fast-track
examination voucher would grant the patentee the same level of right of
exclusion that any regularly prosecuted patent would afford. Maintaining
such uniformity would most likely eliminate any extra costs that might be
associated with a government-mandated scheme or government backed
patent prizes.
Furthermore, granting a fast-track examination voucher would most
likely introduce less controversy than the aforementioned patent term
extensions. If the voucher were instead used to extend the patent term, and
could still be sold on the open market to any patentee in any industry,
serious questions would most likely arise. Should the extended term voucher

275. See supra Part VI.B.
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be applied with the initial patent application? It should be considered
whether the voucher be applied to a patent near the end of its term, so as to
add additional time in the eleventh hour. In addition, we must examine how
the public could (or should) be notified of extended time applied to the
patent. Other issues include the length of the extension and whether the
extended time should be proportional to the amount of data collaboration
under which the voucher was first awarded. By applying the voucher to the
front of the process during the initial examination, these questions would not
be raised. A patent processed with a fast-track examination voucher would
still be enforceable for a term of twenty years from application date.
Finally, this proposed voucher system could help to avoid increased
transaction costs.
With researchers voluntarily entering into data
collaborations there would be no need for RTLAs as the data and research
tools would be openly available. With instant access to the latest research
data, collaborators and outside scientists would not have to wait for license
negotiations to be hammered out and could instead focus on efficiently
moving their research forward. Open data sharing would eliminate research
and development tollbooths and help to eliminate the aforementioned
cognitive biases that overinflate the value of research data.276
IX. CONCLUSION
Looking to the Alzheimer’s Disease Neuroimaging Initiative as an
example, incentivizing collaboration and data and resource sharing among
research organizations can be an effective way to further the search for
solutions to humanity’s most vexing diseases. By utilizing a pull mechanism
of a fast-track examination voucher to incentivize collaboration, the USPTO
can play a vital role in such searches and can further fulfill its constitutional
mandate of “promot[ing] the Progress of Science and the useful Arts.”277
Such an expansion of the proposed USPTO voucher program could operate
more efficiently at alleviating an anticommons in biotechnology research
and development, should one exist. With participation being completely
voluntary, the program could more closely attain the goals of an open
source system than the previously proposed solutions. The voluntary nature
of the program would not require differing patent protection based on the
technology area of the application; maintaining a uniform patent system for
all applications. This proposed fast-track examination voucher would
dovetail well with current USPTO initiatives that allow the USPTO to better
prioritize workload and accelerate examination times.278 The NIH is even

276. See supra Part V.A.
277. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
278. USPTO STRATEGIC PLAN, supra note 187.
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recognizing the need for programs like the proposed fast-track examination
voucher. Seeing that pharmaceutical companies “have neither the will nor
the resources” to forge ahead with research in many areas, the NIH is
injecting $1 billion into the new National Center for Advancing Translational
Sciences.279 The goal of the new center is to complete as much research as
necessary to entice pharmaceutical company investment.280 The activities
could range from the initial screening of chemicals that might factor into a
drug or cure to performing animal and human tests.281 Once the research
achieves the requisite commercial appeal, the activities would be transferred
from the “academic support line and into the private sector.”282 Thus, a
fast-track patent examination voucher can be an integral part of a concerted
effort to ensure the continued search for the keys to human health and well
being.
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